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Doing Knowing Ethically – where social work values meet critical realism. 
Abstract 
This article focuses on the injustices experienced by already marginalised groups when they 
are excluded from participation in society, specifically within the realms of knowledge 
production and transfer.  In this sense they are wronged as ‘knowers’ and experience 
epistemic injustice, either as a consequence of perceived credibility deficits or due to a lack 
of understanding of their situation.  As a result, their marginalisation and exclusion grows. 
This article argues that a values orientation of acceptance, awareness and virtue, combined 
with an analytical framework provided by critical realism, can better equip social work 
practitioners and policy makers in identifying and understanding sites of epistemic injustice.  
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Introduction 
The article starts with an outline of an ethical orientation premised on acceptance and 
awareness that I propose could form the foundation for a more ethical way of approaching 
knowing, something I term ‘doing knowing ethically’.  The discussion then turns to two key 
forms of epistemic injustice as outlined by Fricker (2007, 2013) and advanced by others such 
as Anderson (2012) Doan (2017) and Mason (2011): testimonial injustice and hermeneutical 
injustice.  Within this discussion two key issues emerge, the traceability of epistemic injustice 
to prejudice and the ability to identify the relationship between the individual and collective – 
in terms of understanding the causal and sustaining mechanisms of the injustice.  I attempt to 
3 
 
unpick both of these issues and, as the paper progresses, move to show how an analytical 
framework based on ideas from critical realism, primarily drawn from the work of Houston 
(2010), might not just unlock the issues identified, but may also offer practitioners and policy 
makers a practical analytical tool, which can be used to better identify sites of epistemic 
injustice.  Critical realism is viewed as analytically helpful because it is able to provide an 
interpretive framework that can accommodate the stratified nature of the social world, 
something essential to tackling oppression given that its effects stem from individual 
differences and actions, together with systemic issues like concentrations of power and 
resource (see Clifford, 2016).   
 
Over recent years there have been various attempts to apply critical realist ideas to social 
work research (for example Blom and Morén, 2011; Houston, 2010; Morén and Blom, 2003) 
and to qualitative research more generally (see Maxwell, 2012).  With an emphasis on 
seeking to understand why certain interventions may work in one context and not others, 
together with a focus on social change, the appeal to social work is clear.  Systemic 
understanding has long been an important aspiration for social work and gaining an insight 
into the interconnectedness, relationships and dynamic interaction of phenomena is vital if 
the effects of interventions are to be understood as best they might (see Preston-Shoot and 
Agass, 1990).   So, if we are to tackle issues of injustice, an essential first step is to strive to 
understand them – as Houston asserts: ‘it is only by understanding the deep causes of 
oppression that we can develop ways of dismantling it’ (2010, p. 76).  For advocates of 
realistic evaluation understanding demands analytical depth, something which starts with 
penetrating beneath the surface of what is observable in terms of the inputs and outputs of 
intervention programmes (Pawson and Tilley, 1997).  This is because, for critical realists, a 
real world is seen to exist, including in the form of real social structures that are independent 
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of beliefs (realist ontology), yet our knowledge of this world is accepted as being shaped and 
understood via our own constructions that are created as we interact with it (constructivist 
epistemology) (for example see Houston, 2010; Maxwell, 2012).   
 
A starting point for what I am trying to convey, in the sense of setting out a holistic approach 
to countering epistemic injustice - one that draws on an ethically orientated analytical 
framework, which facilitates a critical analysis of individual and group agency within 
stratified social systems - can be found in a relatively simple adaptation of Pawson and 
Tilley’s observation that ‘interventions are always embedded in a range of attitudinal, 
individual, institutional, and societal processes, and thus programme outcomes are generated 
by a range of macro and micro social forces’ (1997, p. 216). With the substitution of a few 
words, it is possible to see more easily the beginnings of what might be possible: ‘social 
injustice is always embedded in a range of attitudinal, individual, institutional, and societal 
processes, and thus epistemic injustice is generated by a range of macro and micro social 
forces’.  Given the level of analysis needed to unpick these various processes, it is helpful to 
remove the somewhat static property that accompanies the term ‘knowledge’, and this is 
where ideas about knowledge as something you do – ‘knowing’ (see Engebretsen, Vøllestad, 
Wahl, Robinson and Heggen, 2015) – become not just interesting, but potentially helpful in 
terms possessing utility for undertaking such a task.  This more active orientation lends itself 
more readily to being able to accommodate the dynamic nature of the subject and I think it 
better enables an analysis of some of the less tangible forces, particularly power, that 
influence knowing.  Thus, it is an interpretation adopted throughout this article.   
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Virtues, values and ethics (work) 
The relationship between power and knowing is important for social work when considering 
how knowledge acts to shape the lives of individuals and communities, lives that often 
feature disadvantage, oppression and exclusion - contexts that are no stranger to social work.  
This point is particularly pertinent when thinking about who is and who is not included in 
policy and decision-making processes or, more pointedly, whose voices are heard and whose 
are not.  Knowledge clearly plays a significant role in social (in)justice and if we are to 
consider all individuals, at some level, as ‘knowers’ of some kind, then part of the injustice 
experienced, either by a disadvantage or an intersectionality of disadvantage (Cabinet Office, 
2017), is epistemic.  Epistemic injustice occurs when individuals are wronged in their 
capacity as knowers (Fricker, 2007).  As a consequence they experience exclusion, their 
voices go unheard and they are unable to affect the policy process or the interventions upon 
which their lives more heavily depend (Doan 2017).  It is unfortunate that it is often not until 
a tragedy occurs that people start to listen and the voices of marginalised groups begin to be 
sought, as the enquiry investigating the horrific fire at Grenfell Tower, London, shows only 
too well: ‘If it be subsequently shown to be true that deregulation had an impact and 
contributed to the Grenfell Fire then everyone can understand that, it adds to the outrage, of 
the voiceless, their frustration and its foreseeability’ (The Grenfell Tower Enquiry, 2018, p. 
38): a statement made, in part, as a response to the alleged disregard shown to the residents’ 
concerns about safety in the tower block, prior to the outbreak of the fire.   
 
While injustices against the voiceless may sometimes feel impossible to overcome, 
particularly when working with individuals who are struggling simply to survival – people on 
the breadline who are increasingly forced to make painful choices between basic needs like 
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food and warmth (for example Loopstra and Lalor, 2017) - pursuing an active approach to 
knowledge permits a greater consideration of transformability and the role of agency within 
this, both individual and collective.  Although social workers may find it hard to realise 
positive social change, being seated - as social work is - between the lives of those less 
advantaged and the lives of those who have more (see Warner, 2015), social workers have 
access to a broad spectrum of different lives and can play a pivotal role in enabling and 
influencing social relations to be more socially just.  If social work practice is to be effective 
and true to the profession’s core values of enhanced social justice and greater emancipation, 
it requires a commitment and active engagement on behalf of workers in respect of ‘seeing 
ethically salient aspects of situations, developing themselves as good practitioners, working 
out the right course of action and justifying who they are and what they have done’ (Banks, 
2016, p. 36).   
 
For Banks, practice like this is ‘ethics work’ and the active processes it entails includes those 
of ‘noticing, attending, thinking, interacting and performing’ (2016, p. 36).  To achieve social 
justice this must be the starting point for practice.  It is therefore the practitioner’s ethical 
orientation towards the people with whom they are working and the systems that surround 
them that can enable their increased representation and participation.  In terms of knowing, 
the ethical catalyst enabling practitioners to notice, think and act in a way commensurate with 
the core values of social work, is that of acceptance.  This is not to be read as a passive, 
inevitable, acceptance, but one which is embracing, outward looking and inclusive, one 
which celebrates difference and is open to alternative possibility.  Without such acceptance it 
is hard to see how entrenched ways of being or knowing can be transformed (see Dore, 
2018).  With it comes tolerance and an ability to embrace the unsettledness that accompanies 
a more open, less imposing and uncertain way of being.  As Rossiter (2011) suggests, in 
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abandoning quests for totally of knowledge (of the individual) ethics is put before knowing – 
in the sense that social workers refrain from invasive or oppressive practice and respect the 
fact that they cannot fully know the individual before them.  This is a crucial point and one 
central to this article.    
 
As envisaged by Banks (2016), part of ethics work involves ‘framing work’, where those 
attempting to make sense of situations within an ethical frame do so attendant to matters of 
harm, benefit, rights and responsibilities.  Alert to context and omission, it is described as a 
process that involves moral perception and critical reflexivity – the latter involving ‘seeing 
the bigger picture of social inequality of which a particular incident is part and recognising 
one’s own role both in framing the picture and featuring in it’ (p.40).  These processes are not 
uncommon to social work and once more highlight that an active approach is required of 
practitioners, in order for them to practice ethically and work towards positive social change.  
As a starting point then, for knowing to become an ethical activity, we have acceptance and 
add to it awareness.  An awareness that enables practitioners to consider policy positions as 
underlying structures and beliefs (see Banks, 2016) and, accepting that critical theory entails 
ideology critique, one that illuminates an understanding of maintained subjugated positions 
and how people in such positions are excluded from equal participation in society (see 
Brookfield, 2009).     
 
Wronged as a ‘knower’  
With a value orientated position in place, what then is the challenge to be overcome? If the 
aim is to enhance knowing as an ethical activity, the implication is that it is not or it may not 
be in certain situations.  Fricker identifies this as epistemic injustice - where someone is 
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wronged, in one of two ways, in their capacity as a knower: either they experience 
testimonial injustice ‘in which someone is wronged in their capacity as a giver of knowledge’ 
or they experience hermeneutical injustice ‘in which someone is wronged in their capacity as 
a subject of social understanding’ (2007, p. 7).  She states that both forms stem from 
prejudice and, in making this a little more explicit in subsequent work, she terms both as sub-
branches of ‘discriminatory epistemic injustice’ (2013, p. 1318).  In the case of testimonial 
injustice the speaker receives a deflated level of credibility from the hearer owing to a 
prejudice in the hearer’s judgement (2007, 2013).  Hermeneutical injustice, on the other hand, 
occurs at an earlier stage in communication and happens when ‘a subject who is already 
hermeneutically marginalized (that is, they belong to a group which does not have access to 
equal participation in the generation of social meanings) is thereby put at an unfair 
disadvantage when it comes to making sense of a significant area of their social experience’ 
(2013, p. 1319).   
 
The exclusion in effect here has potentially wide-ranging consequences, for individuals and 
groups alike.  It can be seen to influence both participation and representation, undermining 
and jeopardising the ability to play an equal, or at least an active, role in society. Where there 
is injustice, there exists an imbalance of power and in the case of hermeneutical injustice, 
Fricker (2007) posits that imbalances in social power deprive those, less powerful, of the 
hermeneutical resources with which to understand some of their social experiences - 
primarily, as their marginalisation has led to diminished collective understanding.  Fricker 
draws on the cases of sexual harassment (2007) and provocation in terms of long-standing 
domestic abuse (2013) to help illustrate what this form of epistemic injustice may look like 
and states that this type of injustice may occur systematically, resulting in persistent and 
wide-ranging hermeneutical marginalisation, or incidentally, where hermeneutical 
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marginalisation is experienced very briefly and/or in relation to a very specific experience 
(2007).  Fricker also contends that identity power; a type of social power; shows itself in the 
use of social stereotypes, utilised in a hearer’s assessment of a speaker’s testimony, and that 
if these stereotypes are prejudicial, testimonial injustice ensues.    
 
An example of an epistemic injustice orientated analysis of social exclusion is offered by 
Doan, who, in analysing the actions of State Officials and the use of Emergency Management 
procedures in relation to the water crisis in Flint, Michigan, introduces us to the term 
‘epistemic redlining’ - ‘the practice of denying conferrals of credibility to residents of 
specific municipalities, generally because those municipalities are deemed to be in a state of 
‘‘financial emergency’’ (2017, p.183).  This practice, Doan argues, disproportionately affects 
African-Americans, playing out in the imposition of State edicts on local populations, who 
become excluded from decision making and democratic participation.  Within his work, Doan 
notes that it is whose knowledge matters that lies at the heart of the crisis being experienced 
by the Flint residents, with Emergency Management inflicting epistemic violence on entire 
populations.  Such acts work not only to exclude but also to create limited versions of 
representation, where those who experience epistemic violence are cast in a distorted light, at 
risk of being unethically pushed into ill-fitting schemas (see Rossiter, 2011). 
 
What is interesting in Doan’s analysis is his conclusion that epistemic redlining ‘cannot be 
traced to prejudice’ (2017, p. 188), yet its effects seemingly affect those more disadvantaged.  
It should be noted that earlier in his work he uses move equivocal language, asserting that ‘it 
is a form of credibility discounting that cannot easily be traced to the prejudices of individual 
officials – its sustaining causes are structural rather than psychological in character’ (p. 186, 
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emphasis added).  For Fricker a type of epistemic injustice, with which Doan’s epistemic 
redlining has strong similarities - where certain social groups may not be asked for 
information or contribution - is that of ‘pre-emptive testimonial injustice’ (2007, p. 130 
emphasis original): this, according to Fricker, is a consequence of identity prejudice and, 
although she does not tie this to a structural form of injustice, she does consider, through the 
lens of social power, how pre-emptive epistemic injustice might function as a mechanism of 
silencing.  Combine this with her comments that social power involves a ‘capacity to control 
others’ actions’ and that it may operate purely structurally or be ‘executed (actively or 
passively) by particular social agents’ (2007, p. 13) and it is, I would suggest, possible to see 
the operation of prejudice at a structural level, something evermore apparent when thinking 
about cases of institutional racism, as identified, for example, by The Stephen Lawrence 
Inquiry (Macpherson, 1999) -  a case Fricker (2013) considers herself, specifically with 
regard to testimonial injustice as perpetrated by the Police.  Before moving on, it is possible 
to see that this interpretation is further strengthened when considering the need to ensure that 
individuals, from any social group, are able to have their voices heard as fully as is possible - 
part of which starts with the need for organisations and institutions to be socially inclusive 
(Fricker, 2013), the increased inclusivity and representation potentially curtailing the 
prejudice that can emerge in closed groups.  This is part of what Fricker (2013) sees as a 
structural response to epistemic injustice, a theme which Anderson (2012) seeks to develop 
by similarly advocating that greater integration between different social groups should be part 
of structural solutions (I shall return to this a little later).   
 
This issue of whether there are forms of testimonial injustice that are structural as well as 
individual, or more accurately traceable to the transactions of individuals, is an important 
point to resolve, in so far as being concerned with setting out the nature and form of 
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epistemic injustice.  Not to do so would undermine the aim of the work at hand: to illustrate 
how it may be possible for social work to contribute to ways of doing knowing ethically, 
thus, we must return to Doan’s analysis.  Within it he considers Anderson’s thoughts that 
testimonial injustice, or testimonial exclusion as she terms it in this regard, ‘becomes 
structural when institutions are set up to exclude people without anyone having to decide to 
do so’ (2012, p166).  Anderson illustrates this with an example in which current practice is 
executed on the basis of historically outdated information.  She notes that the current actors 
are not aware the information is out of date and thus comments that ‘no one need be at moral 
fault’ (2012, p166).  Yet, somewhat contradictorily, her example links the historically 
outdated information to the prejudices of others, now retired.  Furthermore, while the author 
of this information may be long gone, there has, quite clearly, been an act of omission on the 
part of current actors, potentially traceable to a prejudice of one kind or another: they have 
not exercised due diligence towards the information that guides their practice, meaning it 
goes unchallenged and unquestioned.    
 
On this point of agency, Doan arrives at the conclusion that ‘deliberately constructed forms 
of structural epistemic exclusion ought to be counted as instances of epistemic injustice’ 
(2017, p. 186, emphasis original) - the agency of individuals, seen in products of individual 
and collective decision making, acknowledged via acts of commission. Thus, to understand 
cases of structural testimonial injustice it is necessary to explore acts of commission (what 
individuals do) and omission (what individuals do not do) and to try to understand how they 
come to be.  In essence, one needs to go beneath the surface and try to understand the 
influences that cause and sustain the situation observed.  Without doing this, one is left with a 
perceptive absence, which obscures the layered nature of injustice.  This includes the 
compounding impact of hermeneutical injustice which renders some groups mute - their 
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exclusion reinforces their exclusion and removes them from societal participation, the 
structural social power so dispersed it lacks a subject (Fricker, 2007) making it hard to 
quantify and explicitly pinpoint.  As Hoggett, Wilkinson and Beedell (2013) found, 
resentment and grievance were more likely to be directed towards those in closest proximity 
to the individual, rather than those more powerful, but less visible, whose own privileges 
came at the expense of others’ disadvantage – hence efforts to improve understanding, like 
much else in social work, call for critical analysis and a forensic unpicking of what is initially 
seen. 
     
Before getting to how that might be achieved, it is necessary to probe the point made by 
Anderson (2012) which questions - as does Doan (2017) - the condition, asserted by Fricker, 
that instances of epistemic injustice have prejudice at their root cause.  For Anderson, the key 
issue in relation to this is why even unintended epistemic errors cannot be considered as 
harmful to the speaker. This would seem to be a fair question and, again, I believe it is related 
to the knotty issue of identifiability and the stratified nature of social power - the heart of the 
problem being the relationship between individual and structural causes of the injustice.  At 
times, social power exerts an invisible influence on social attitudes and behaviours - our 
social interactions owning much to the opaque power of privilege and prejudice that is deeply 
embedded in social systems: the world affects us, we affect the world.  Often this happens 
without explicit recognition and, before you know it, in a few years’ time a situation has 
come to pass that seemingly lacks coherent explanation.  This is where I also think Doan 
struggles, in terms of his ability to articulate the connection between the individual and the 
structural, in terms of traceability to prejudice.  While he states that individual prejudices and 
structural conditions will influence each other, commenting that ‘the state legislature has 
codified a patently false story concerning municipal fiscal distress – a story that originates in, 
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and also takes advantage of, the sheer ubiquity of anti-black racism and hatred for the poor’ 
(2017, p. 187), he adds – in relation to the structural manifestations of this particular form of 
epistemic exclusion – that they are not ‘obviously or straightforwardly the products of the 
judgements of any particular individual or group’ (p. 187) .  For me, what is visible once 
more, in addition to acts of commission, are acts of omission (the prevailing situation has 
gone unchallenged) and I see these as being traceable to a prejudice of one kind or another, in 
contrast to Doan’s less certain view.  It is this difficulty, to be able to identify and better 
understand sites of epistemic injustice, which is central to the aims of this article – and its 
intent to provide an analytical framework to help enable this.    
 
In recognising the interplay between the individual and the structural, the second point that 
Anderson (2012) raises, in relation to the issue of traceability to prejudice, is to propose 
remedial steps that embody a structural dimension.  Something that, as we’ve seen, Fricker 
attends to in later work.  What Anderson does along the way to proposing structural 
responses, is to offer some thoughts as to what may cause and sustain structural injustices: the 
issue of access to education for example, and how its denial results in further exclusion from 
participation.  Some parallels may be seen here with the compounding nature of 
hermeneutical injustice discussed earlier, yet Anderson’s contribution is noteworthy for 
drawing attention to the harm of segregation and the possible merits of group integration, 
something which she positions, perhaps a little more clearly, as a structural remedy, than 
Fricker.  Sticking with the example of integrated education, she contends: ‘shared inquiry 
also tends to produce a shared reality, which can help overcome hermeneutical injustice and 
its attendant testimonial injustices’ (2012, p. 171).  Indeed, at time of rising inequality (World 
Economic Forum, 2015) the need for effective responses to reduce the gap between the haves 
and the have nots, in both an educational and financial sense, has arguably never been 
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stronger.  Before I move onto considering what the stepped processes of remedial action 
might look like, primarily at an individual level, it is important to recognise what has 
additionally been considered as part of the responses to epistemic injustice put forward by 
Fricker and Anderson - there is something present that is not only common to social work, 
but something which is an essential part of good social work practice: reflexivity and self-
awareness. 
 
In Fricker’s (2007) initial conceptions an emphasis was placed on individual, virtue based, 
responses: testimonial justice and hermeneutical justice.   For the former, the hearer is alert to 
and corrects their credibility judgement and, for the latter, also entailing reflexive awareness, 
the hearer is conscious of how the ‘relation between his social identity and that of the speaker 
is impacting on the intelligibility to him of what she is saying and how she is saying it’ 
(Fricker, 2007, p. 196).  The merits of reflective practice in social work are widely recognised 
(for example see Munro, 2011; Ruch, 2002) and while part of this may entail reflecting on 
unsettling experiences, as Anderson (2012) considers, if a self-aware reflective perspective is 
present at the outset unsettledness (in relation to what is thought to be known) may be 
provoked at an earlier moment, facilitated by workers questioning themselves and others.  If 
so, this would enable practitioners to proactively challenge assumptions, prior to their contact 
with individuals, some of whom may have previously elicited a prejudicial response of one 
kind or another – unconscious or otherwise.  As Anderson helpfully observes, in questioning 
the seemingly assumptive nature of Fricker’s faith in the individual to challenge their own 
prejudices, particularly those hidden within unconscious cognitive biases, structural remedies 
may well be required to help enable individual virtue.  In this sense, forums such as 
supervision, when supported and championed by organisations, can be seen as vital spaces 
with the potential to provoke curiosity as a virtue and enable workers to be alert to and 
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address any biases they may have.  Cemented by acceptance and awareness, it is conceivable 
then that epistemic virtue can be realised at an earlier stage than has been imagined.   
 
Critical realism, a valuable resource  
While the ethical orientation (that of individual and structural virtue, combined with the 
foundational values of acceptance and awareness, as earlier described) is an essential starting 
point and one aligned to the realisation of justice and positive social change, social workers 
do not just draw on values and ethical perspectives; effective practice is both ethically 
grounded and tied to critical engagement with a range of knowledge sources.  In terms of 
intervening, as it were, in respect of epistemic injustice, practitioners need to be able to detect 
and identify when acts of injustice have occurred or are at work.  As such, they, and policy 
makers, need to be equipped with an analytical tool capable of supporting a structural 
exploration, one which incorporates Brookfield’s conception of critical theory and critical 
reflection - namely that it must have a concern with ‘uncovering, and challenging, the power 
dynamics that frame practice and uncovering and challenging hegemonic assumptions (those 
assumptions we embrace as being in our best interests when in fact they are working against 
us)’ (2009, p. 293).  With its emancipatory bent and intent to promote social change (see 
Houston, 2010), critical realism appears to have something useful to offer in this regard. 
 
Critical realism, whilst not a perspective I fully subscribe to, given my preference for a 
constructivist approach (see Dore, 2018), can, as I have argued elsewhere (Dore, 2006), offer 
insight that is more ontologically astute than some of the harder, positivist orientated, 
incarnations that feature in discussions about knowledge and use of evidence in social work.  
The utility that critical realism offers, lies in the quest for understanding, together with it 
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pragmatically combining realist ontology with constructive epistemology.  More pointedly, 
critical realism’s philosophical interest in how things like actors’ choices, intentions and 
motivations interact with the parameters of social structures (Houston, 2010) is likely to be 
able to offer at least some insight into how agency operates within social systems.  It is 
envisaged that this insight could then help identify sites of epistemic injustice and the place 
of prejudice within them. 
 
We are moving towards what it is that critical realism can offer in the quest for ethical 
knowing – that is, a tool to help strengthen ethical practice.  For both types of injustice, 
testimonial and hermeneutic, the significance is clear: ‘When we systematically exclude 
people of a particular social identity – such as women, people of color [sic], disabled people, 
and many intersectional identities – we enact both epistemic and political violence’ 
(McKinnon, 2016, p. 442), as a consequence their situations become more perilous and that is 
why the quest for ethical knowing is so important.  As you might expect, in trying to get to a 
position of ethical knowing, there are going to be a few bumps in the road and here it should 
be recognised that both types of injustice possess two interrelated and seemingly intractable 
issues: the divide between the individual and the collective and, secondly, the traceability to 
prejudice.  While some attempt has already been made to unpick these, they require a level of 
analysis that can accommodate a stratified understanding and one that is able to consider 
some of the more opaque structures and powers that influence and shape the social world, 
along with the individuals within it.   
 
Before getting into the detail about precisely how critical realism might help with this task, it 
is pertinent to further illustrate the nature of what we are up against, by considering two 
additional contributions, one concerning testimonial injustice and the other hermeneutical 
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injustice.   In McKinnon’s discussion paper, she draws on Dotson’s notion of testimonial 
smothering, a form of testimonial injustice, that proposes the idea that if a speaker senses that 
an audience is unlikely to give them a credible hearing – perhaps linked to an identity 
prejudice of some kind – they will choose not to speak: she notes ‘so while the speaker 
decides for themself not to speak, it’s often due to a pre-existing injustice in practices of 
uptake and credibility assessments’ (2016, p.443).  This is valuable in terms of the current 
discussion, because it directs attention to acts of omission on behalf of the speaker, rather 
than the hearer, whilst continuing to call one to question the interplay between the structural 
and individual dynamic.  
 
The next point comes from Mason (2011), who posits that, in terms of hermeneutical 
injustice, Fricker conflates two strands of collective hermeneutical resource – dominant and 
non-dominant – and therefore does not adequately account for the fact that there may be a 
gap in collective (dominant) hermeneutical resource, which, in fact, subjects the dominant 
group to a form of ‘unknowing’.  This epistemological ignorance means the dominant group 
lacks the resources to understand those in non-dominant positions, something enacted ‘by 
disregarding or distorting interpretations offered by marginalized groups’ (p. 306), the 
group’s unknowing brought about by ‘their ethically bad knowledge practices’ (p. 295).  
Their action results in the non-dominant group also being subject to a form of unknowing, a 
consequence of their hermeneutical marginalization by the dominant group.  Here Mason 
notes that privilege does not necessarily operate across all social domains - social perception 
being one of them.  Once more, this guides us towards an interpretive framework that can 
accommodate the stratified nature of the social world and one which is capable of exploring 
causal powers and collective intentionality (see Elder-Vass, 2015).  Given the operation of 
social power, a consideration of both causal powers and collective intentionality may well 
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prove helpful in facilitating an analysis of individual and group agency, particularly their 
interactional consequences – the salience of such seen in Mason’s contention that ‘identity 
power depends on the context of a functioning social world with shared institutions, shared 
meanings, and shared expectations that facilitate systematic identity-based prejudice’ (2011, 
p. 299). 
 
Seeing better with critical realism 
In contemplating how ideas from critical realism might work alongside the method of action 
research to promote anti-oppressive social work research, Houston (2010) has offered much 
by way of inspiration for what I think critical realism can achieve with regards to ethical 
knowing.  Recall earlier thoughts on traceability to prejudice, the unseen operation of power 
and the role of agency?  It is here where the challenge of what is and, more pressingly, what 
is not seen, requires a little help from an analytical framework that is capable of contending 
with different ‘versions’ of reality, or, in critical realist terms, ‘levels’: ‘the ‘‘empirical’’ (the 
level of experiences), the ‘‘actual’’ (the level of events) and the ‘‘real’’ (the level of 
generative mechanisms)’’ (p. 88).  It is this last, causal, level which can point policy makers 
and practitioners towards more inclusive, and therefore more epistemologically just, 
practices.  The key question for investigation that arises here is ‘what it is that generates the 
events (outcomes) seen?’.   
 
To answer this, critical realists propose an analysis that takes into account context (Pawson 
and Tilley, 1997), together with time and agency (Houston, 2010) and one that includes 
theorising about the unseen generative mechanisms themselves (see Blom and Morén, 2011; 
Houston, 2010; Pawson and Tilley, 1997).  Applying these conceptual ideas to epistemic 
injustice, or, more accurately, applying them in order to help increase our understanding of it, 
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means, for example, that if the outcomes of injustice are to be traced to prejudice, as I believe 
they can, the nature of the mechanism must be understood as fully as possible.  Although the 
visible outcome may be all too apparent – manifesting in the exclusion or segregation of 
certain individuals, or groups of individuals, from equal participation in society – explaining 
its cause demands careful exploration and consideration of the layered nature of the social 
world.   
 
Blom and Morén (2011) offer a useful window into what this may actually look like from an 
analytical perspective, applying their thinking specifically to social work.  They describe 
three levels of social mechanism, operating at a micro, meso or macro level within society, 
and describe each mechanism as being a combination of powers – in terms of causes, 
motives, considerations and choices – plus social interaction and structure.  Thus, each level 
of social mechanism has its own specific social and material structures that mediates it: for 
the micro this includes role expectations related to gender and ethnicity, and for the macro it 
includes education systems and political parties.  For Houston (2010) this looks a little 
different, he describes five domains in social life, each embodying a different type of power 
(something I shall return to later) – these range from the domain of the person to the domain 
of the economy.  For the former, he cites the attachment mechanism as a primary example of 
a mechanism operating at a psychological level and, for the latter, the various mechanisms 
inherent in capitalism, including the commodification of labour and consumption.  Now, it is 
beyond the scope and indeed the aims of this article to unpick critical realist conceptions of 
the stratified nature of the social world in detail, as what is of ultimate concern is the 
assertion that to understand how events may occur, one must adopt a systemic approach that 
acknowledges that there is understanding to be had that goes beyond the level of experience 
and ‘the actual’.  An approach that is able to accommodate the following: the notion that an 
20 
 
outcome may or may not been seen, depending on the activation of a specific mechanism (or 
mechanisms), within a specific layer of social life, in a given context, at a given time and 
with due consideration of agency.   
 
What does all of this tell us and how might it be used for the benefit of knowing justly?  So 
far I have outlined the relevance of critical realism in three key ways.  In summary, these are: 
the ability to enhance understanding of the stratified nature of social systems; the ability to 
accommodate the role of agency; the ability to conceptualise different levels of reality, 
particularly in terms of what cannot be seen – the level of the ‘real’.  Here we have a rough 
analytical framework that, I believe, is able to aid the identification of sites of epistemic 
injustice and the role played by prejudice within this.  Let me flesh this out with a couple of 
examples.  In Blom and Moran’s conceptualisation, they note that intentionality is a 
fundamental human power that serves as a driving force behind motives, considerations and 
choices, and that – and this is where it comes alive in terms of epistemic injustice – 
‘intentionality can, in turn, be affected by previous causes and the circumstance that 
condition human opportunities to choose’ (2011, p. 64).  Using this as a lens, it is possible to 
see how history and context can, quite clearly, influence agency, both in terms of commission 
and omission.  Thus, with this analytical framework in place, Anderson’s (2012) claim that 
current practice – executed on the basis of historically outdated information, linked to the 
prejudices of others – does not need to involve the moral fault of anyone in the present, 
becomes more readily refutable.     
 
Consider too, Doan’s (2017) notion that credibility discounting cannot easily be traced to the 
prejudices of individual officials, because its sustaining causes are structural, in view of 
Houston’s thoughts that the domain of culture ‘refers to the belief systems, norms, rituals, 
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social practices, customs and tastes that generate meaning and social cohesion but also serve 
to divide and oppress’ (2010, p. 81).  Put this together with what has just been considered in 
terms of intentionality and agency, and again, it is possible to see that individuals play a 
definitive role in the (re)production of structural epistemic injustice.  The final re-visit needed 
takes us back to an earlier suggestion that, given the influence of social power, a 
consideration of both causal powers and collective intentionality may be helpful in 
facilitating an analysis of individual and group agency.  Although Mason’s (2011) 
observation that identity power depends on shared institutions, meanings and expectations 
does much of the work for me here, in terms of providing a position statement, it is useful to 
try and tidy this up a little, within the parameters of what can be achieved in the remaining 
space of this article.   
 
While Mason’s views sit quite comfortably with my own, more constructivist interpretations 
of ‘reality’ (see Dore, 2018) – heavily influenced as they are by Searle’s (2006) thoughts on 
collective intentionally and how enduring version of reality can be ‘known’, or rather be seen 
to be epistemically objective, despite being created by the actions and attitudes of individuals 
– this moves us to a different ontological place.  This should not be a problem, given my aim 
of borrowing from critical realism in order to hone analytical capability, but, none-the-less, it 
is important to tie things off as smoothly as I can.  This is where Elder-Vass’ (2015) work, 
which gives voice to the idea that collective intentionality can help to explain some of the 
mechanisms that generate social causal powers, is sympathetic.  In it, he considers whether or 
not collectively intentionality, causal power or both are evident in various types of social 
interactions and, what is especially handy here, is this rather simple statement: ‘collective 
intentionality ultimately depends for its causal significance on the existence of an actual 
collective composed of individuals who share the collective intention’ (p. 267).  A collective 
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intent, such as, to continue to follow out-dated information or to not revise laws or policies 
that serve to subjugate or discriminate against certain individuals or groups or, thinking about 
a UK welfare policy, to persist with the implementation of a new form of benefit payment 
(Universal Credit) despite multiple reports that it causes harm to claimants and doubts about 
it ever achieving value for money (see National Audit Office, 2018). What is more clearly 
visible now is the somewhat elusive dynamic between the individual and the collective.  
 
To bring these analytical underpinnings alive, in away befitting Engebretsen et al’s (2015) 
notion of knowing as an active process – and to make them more practically employable –
greater accessibility is needed.  This is something that can be found in the critical realist 
method of retroduction (see Houston, 2010).  A process which starts with asking questions 
that should already be a feature of good social work practice – questions like ‘what is it that 
causes this situation to be as it is?’ and ‘why’ questions, related to the behaviours and 
responses of service users.  In critical realist terms these are transcendental questions and are 
those concerned with understanding the ‘actual’ level of reality (see Houston, 2010).  This 
process concludes with emancipatory action (see figure 1) – namely to challenge and change 
the oppressive mechanism in play.  
 
 
 
 
Retroduction 
Step One Asking a transcendental question 
 
Step Two Developing a priori hypotheses to address the question in terms of: (a) the generative 
mechanisms at play (b) the role of ‘agency’, ‘time’ and ‘context’ 
Step Three Seeking for evidence of hypotheses by looking for the effects of mechanisms and their 
interplay with ‘agency’, ‘time’ and ‘context’ 
Step Four Refining, confirming, falsifying or reworking hypotheses and seeking more 
evidence 
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Step Five Instigating emancipatory action to counter oppressive mechanisms and 
activating enabling mechanisms 
 
Figure 1. Steps in Retroduction (taken from Houston, 2010, p. 83). 
 
 
From the established body of literature discussing epistemic injustice in relation to people 
experiencing mental ill-health, some examples of what emancipatory action might look 
include the use of advocacy - primarily useful for alleviating testimonial injustice 
(Newbigging and Ridley, 2018) - and, in relation to those experiencing mental distress who 
have also been the victims of crime, the need to create conditions of empowerment which 
ensure that voices are not just heard, but also where opinions are held with equal weight 
within criminal justice and other state systems (see Carver, Morley and Taylor, 2017).  These 
thoughts share common ground with the remedial processes considered by Fricker and 
Anderson, in terms of promoting inclusivity within institutions and integration between 
different social groups, yet such actions are dependent on first identifying and recognising 
sites of epistemic injustice. This is where the analytical framework provided by critical 
realism is of use, as it can provide an enhanced understanding which may then be drawn on to 
inform enhanced intervention.  Social workers and policy makers who are aware and alert to 
how their and their employing organisations’ social power may unduly subjugate the voices 
of the people with whom they are seeking to work, are more likely to be able to identify the 
underlying – prejudicial – mechanisms that cause the situations they encounter to be as they 
are.  This requires workers to be critically and systematically astute in their questioning of 
events and mindful of how things like their identity, privilege and professional training 
shapes what they see and what they do not (steps two to four of the retroduction process are 
salient here - see figure 1).   
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In terms of further enhancing emancipatory action, I suggest that when practitioners also 
embrace acceptance, they will be better placed to both identify structural causes of epistemic 
injustice and to further question how they can use their agency help remedy them; perhaps by 
creating conditions where they are able to give at least some of their power away.  Accepting 
the limitations of their own ability to ‘know’ and recognising service users as experts by 
experience is a good starting point for change, something which the concept of co-production 
may further strengthen.  Co-production is a model of partnership working that goes beyond 
involving service users in the planning and design stages of service delivery.  It also means 
that people who use services takeover some of the work done by practitioners (SCIE, 2015) - 
another example of inclusive action which could help foster a re-alignment of status and 
power relationships.  In sum, through the stepped process of retroduction - which upholds the 
principles of analysis as systemically critical - those involved in social work practice and 
policy making can be seen to be equipped with a practical tool that may help strengthen their 
capabilities for ethical knowing. Its use in supervision, either on an individual or group basis, 
perhaps the most obvious place to start - organisational support permitting.  
 
Conclusion 
In considering the nature of social work as ethics work, together with the notion of 
knowledge as one that is active and dynamic, influenced and shaped by social power, it has 
been possible to set the foundations for ethical knowing, premised on the principles of 
acceptance and awareness.  A starting point that positions the individual ‘doing’ the knowing 
in a place where there is an ethically guided openness to transformability, supported by a 
critical orientation that is systematically astute.  Such a position may allow practitioners to 
take more confident steps towards understanding the nature of maintained subjugation and 
how this works to perpetuate exclusion and unequal participation in society, particularly in 
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relation to knowledge production and transfer.  Here, an understanding of exclusion, 
marginalisation and the nature of social power has been advanced through an exploration of 
epistemic injustice, both testimonial and hermeneutic. This has served to highlight the way in 
which certain groups appear to be caught in a spiral of social exclusion, with each twist, their 
stake in society and credibility further eroded, further discounted.   
 
Attempting to understand manifestations of epistemic injustice has revealed some interesting 
areas for development and expansion, something that this article has endeavoured to build 
upon - making links between social work, epistemic injustice and critical realism.  Most 
notably, what I have tried to set out are the beginnings of an analytical framework that can 
help practitioners and policy makers better identify and understand sites of epistemic 
injustice, recognising it as a form of social injustice that also causes moral harm, either 
directly as a result of being harmed as a knower – given the central importance to humans of 
epistemic life (McKinnon, 2016) – or indirectly as a result of subsequent social exclusion.  A 
key instrument aiding this task has been critical realist thinking, which has enabled some of 
the previously unanswered questions, such as those related to the traceability to prejudice, to 
have more tangible answers.  As a concept, its strength, in relation to expanding the 
understanding of epistemological injustice as applicable to social work, has been in its ability 
to do three things: contend with the stratified nature of social systems, to accommodate the 
role of agency and to conceptualise the different, unseen, levels of reality.  The importance of 
this last point, neatly expressed in this statement from Houston: ‘Social work, to be truly anti-
oppressive, must understand the nature of and interplay between these different levels if it is 
to rise to the challenges posed by modern life’ (2010, p. 88).  Some of those future challenges 
will continue to involve questions about exclusion and representation and there is, no doubt, 
further scope in exploring what ideas about epistemic (in)justice and critical realism have to 
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add to questions about things like social participation and equality, subjects of keen interest 
to social work. 
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